




Detecting Backdoors During the Inference Stage Based on Corruption Robustness Consistency

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
1. Introduction

In this paper, we propose the <u>test-time corruption robustness consistency evaluation (TeCo)</u>, a novel test-time trigger sample detection method that only needs the hard-label outputs of the victim models without any extra information.

	Black-b	ox Access	No Need of	Т	Trigger Aussmptions				
Method	Logits-based	Decision-based	Clean Data	Universal	Sample-specific	Invisible			
SentiNet [5]	0	0	0	•	0	0			
SCan [39]	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	•	\bigcirc	\bigcirc			
Beatrix [30]	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	•	•	•			
NEO ³ [42]	•	•	•	0	0	0			
STRIP [12]	•	\bigcirc	\bigcirc	•	\bigcirc	\bigcirc			
FreqDetector [48]	•	•	\bigcirc	•	•	•			
TeCo (Ours)	•	•	۲	٠	•	•			

2. Insights


Given a backdoor-infected model, it will show clearly different robustness for trigger samples influenced by different image corruptions. However, for the clean images, the model will show similar robustness against the majority of image corruptions.



(b) The curves of ACC on clean images

2. Insights

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3. Method


A reasonable understanding is that the reduction of ACC or ASR is equivalent to the transitions of prediction labels. Consequently, we can evaluate the corruption robustness consistency in the inference stage by adding image corruptions with growing severity, and recording the severity when the model's hard-label prediction gets changed.

Algorithm 1: Test-time CRC Evaluation (TeCo) **Input:** Test sample x; test model C_{θ} ; deviation measurement method Dev; image corruption set \mathcal{D}_{K}^{N} , where K is the number of corruption types, and N is the maximum of severity. **Output:** Prediction score of test sample x. 1 Initialize $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \{\}, P_{org} \leftarrow C_{\theta}(x);$ 2 for k = 1 to K do $L \leftarrow N + 1$: 3 for n = 1 to N do 4 if $C_{\theta}(D_k^n(x)) \neq P_{org}$ then 5 $L \leftarrow n;$ 6 break; 7 8 end end 9 $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{L\};$ 10 11 end 12 deviation $\leftarrow Dev(\mathcal{L});$ 13 return deviation

4. Evaluations

Extensive experiments demonstrate that compared with state-of-the-art defenses, TeCo outperforms them on different backdoor attacks, datasets, and model architectures, enjoying a higher AUROC by 10% and 5 times of stability.


	$Attack \rightarrow$	Badne	ts [14]	Blend	led [3]	LF	[48]	Input-av	vare [32]	Wane	t [33]	LIR	A [8]	SSBA	A [26]	AV	G(†)	ST	D(↓)
Model	Detection↓	AUROC	F1 score	AUROC	F1 score	AUROC	F1 score	AUROC	F1 score	AUROC	F1 score	AUROC	F1 score	AUROC	F1 score	AUROC	F1 score	AUROC	F1 score
	STRIP	0.790	0.743	0.726	0.685	0.973	0.937	0.283	0.526	0.395	0.526	0.555	0.661	0.364	0.526	0.584	0.658	0.236	0.140
PreActResNet18	FreqDetector	0.989	0.955	0.966	0.904	0.886	0.809	1.000	0.993	0.566	0.550	0.912	0.840	0.896	0.824	0.888	0.839	0.138	0.134
	Ours	0.911	0.917	0.935	0.946	0.939	0.937	0.905	0.921	0.915	0.905	0.953	0.934	0.868	0.883	0.918	0.920	0.026	0.020



5. Beyond TeCo

An adaptive loss to attack the proposed TeCo:

$$\mathcal{J}_{bd} = \sum_{i=1}^{I} CE(C_{ heta}(x_i),y_i) + \sum_{j=1}^{J} CE(C_{ heta}(\hat{x}_j),y_t)
onumber \ \mathcal{J}_{ada} = \sum_{j=1}^{J} \sum_{k=1}^{K} \sum_{n=1}^{N} \mathrm{MSE}ig(\mathrm{MSE}ig(C_{ heta}(x_j),C_{ heta}ig(D_n^k(x_j)ig)ig),\mathrm{MSE}ig(C_{ heta}(\hat{x}_j),C_{ heta}ig(D_n^k(\hat{x}_j)ig)ig)$$




The adaptive loss grows when the backdoor loss decreases, which means the success on the dualtarget loss function may drive the model to behave differently in terms of corruption robustness.

5. Beyond TeCo

The adaptive loss pushes the trigger samples from the edge of latent space to the center, making them have a similar distance to different clean samples. Thus, a possible way to attack TeCo is to embed trigger samples in the middle of the latent space.

$W eight {\rightarrow}$	0		10	-3	10	-4	10^{-5}		
Attack↓	AUROC	F1 score							
BadNets	0.9112	0.9174	0.5763 0.5928		0.6571	0.6542	0.6745	0.6657	
LF	0.9390	0.9367	0.8592	0.8483	0.9219	0.9154	0.8667	0.8858	
SSBA	0.8683 0.8835		0.7125 0.7312		0.6477 0.7281		0.5909 0.6852		
$W\!eight\!\rightarrow$	0		10	-3	10	-4	10^{-5}		
Attack↓	C.ACC	ASR	C.ACC	ASR	C.ACC	ASR	C.ACC	ASR	
BadNets	0.9153	0.9502	0.5105	0.7386	0.7980	0.3720	0.8546	0.3001	
LF	0.9286	0.9888	0.8022	0.9443	0.8864	0.9504	0.8962	0.9476	



Thanks! https://github.com/CGCL-codes/TeCo