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Problem Statement

- Federated Learning (FL) facilitates clients to collaborate on training a shared machine learning model without **exposing individual private data**.
- Requires **auditability** and **verifiability** to ensure **local data integrity** and **trustworthy client updates**.
- Existing FL frameworks rely on a server for **client selection** and **aggregation**, creating a **single point of failure** and **privacy risks**.

Proposed Solution: FAVD (Figure 1)

- Federated auditable and verifiable data valuation (FAVD)** ensures auditability and verifiability of client contributions without a central authority.
- Utilizes **local data density functions** to construct a global density function for transparent and effective data valuation before training.
- Gaussian noise** is added to shared density functions to mitigate privacy risks.

Key Contributions

- Privacy-preserving data valuation** independent of any predefined training algorithm.
- Ensures **benign updates** even in the presence of **malicious data**.
- Theoretical analysis on **convergence**, **auditability**, **verifiability**, and **resilience** against **data poisoning threats**.
- Improves fairness by **distinguishing** high-impact contributions from low-quality data.
- Comprehensive evaluation on five benchmark datasets with various models:** Covid-chestxray (ResNet50), Camelyon17 (DenseNet121), HAM10000 (FL-FixCaps), CIFAR10 (ResNet18), CIFAR100 (ResNet50).
- Introduces novel metrics for auditable data valuation**
 - Malicious Sample Detection Rate (MSDR)
 - Benign Misclassification Rate (BMR)
 - Client Contribution Consistency (CCC) Score




Figure 1. Overview of the FAVD-integrated FL system, with client-side and server-side execution.

Algorithm 1 Standard FL with our FAVD framework

Input: Global model $\mathcal{G}_{\theta,t}$, local data $\mathcal{D}_k = (\mathcal{X}_k, \mathcal{Y}_k)$, privacy noise parameters $\rho_{\mathcal{N}} = (\mu_{\mathcal{N}}, \Sigma_{\mathcal{N}})$, auditing parameter γ

Output: Global test accuracy $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{G}}$

- Client execution** ($\theta_g^t, \rho_g = (\mu_g, \Sigma_g)$):
- for** each client $k = 1$ **to** n **do**
- Initialize the local model $\theta_k^t \leftarrow \theta_g^t$
- if** client k is malicious **then**
- $\Phi(\mathcal{X}_k) \leftarrow \mathcal{X}_k + \epsilon \mathcal{P}$
- $\mathcal{D}_k(\mathcal{X}_k) \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_k(\Phi(\mathcal{X}_k))$
- $\mathcal{D}_k^{\mathcal{F}}, \rho_k \leftarrow \text{FAVD}(\mathcal{D}_k, \gamma, \rho_{\mathcal{N}}, f_{\theta,k})$
- for** $b = 1$ **to** batches $\in \mathcal{D}_k^{\mathcal{F}} = (\mathcal{X}_k^{\mathcal{F}}, \mathcal{Y}_k)$ **do**
- $\{\mathcal{Q}_{b,k}\} \leftarrow \{\sigma(f_{\theta,k}(\mathcal{X}_k^{\mathcal{F}}[b]))\}$
- $\mathcal{L}_{CE_k}(\mathcal{Q}_{b,k}, \mathcal{Y}_{b,k}) \leftarrow \text{Eq. 2, Cross-entropy loss}$
- $\theta_k^t \leftarrow \theta_k^t - \eta \nabla_{\theta_k^t} \mathcal{L}_{CE_k}$
- $\nabla \theta_k^t \leftarrow \theta_k^t - \theta_g^t$ \triangleright **FAVD verified updates**
- return** $\nabla \theta_k^t, \rho_k = (\tilde{\mu}_k, \tilde{\Sigma}_k)$
- Server execution** ($\nabla \theta_k^t, \rho_k$):
- Receive model updates from selected clients $\leftarrow \nabla \theta_k^t$
- Perform model aggregation using FedAvg (**Eq. 1**)
- Update the global model parameter: θ_g^{t+1}
- Update $\rho_g \leftarrow (\frac{1}{n} \sum_{k=1}^n \tilde{\mu}_k, \frac{1}{n} \sum_{k=1}^n \tilde{\Sigma}_k)$
- Share $\theta_g^t, \rho_g = (\mu_g, \Sigma_g)$ to all the clients
- Compute $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{G}} \leftarrow \text{Test}(\mathcal{G}_{\theta_g^{t+1}}, \mathcal{X}_{test})$
- return** $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{G}}$




Figure 2. FAVD auditable data valuation process

Definition 3.1 (ω -bounded poisoned data.) Let \mathcal{F} be the adversary's function class. An adversarial perturbation \mathcal{U} is characterized by the mapping $\mathcal{U} := \mathcal{F} \times \mathcal{X}_k \times \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \Phi(\mathcal{X}_k)$. For $\omega > 0$, we define the L_2 norm ball as $\mathcal{B}_2(\mathcal{X}_k, \omega) := \{\Phi(\mathcal{X}_k) \in \mathbb{R}^d : \|\Phi(\mathcal{X}_k) - \mathcal{X}_k\| \leq \omega\} \cap \mathcal{X}_k$. We classify the adversarial perturbation \mathcal{U} as ω -bounded if it adheres to the condition $\mathcal{U}(\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{X}_{k,i}, \mathcal{Y}_{k,i})_{i=1}^{\nu} \in \mathcal{B}(\mathcal{X}_{k,i}, \omega)_{i=1}^{\nu}$. Furthermore, for a given $\omega > 0$, we denote the worst-case adversarial perturbation (\mathcal{U}^+) as

$$\mathcal{U}^+ := \arg \max_{\Phi(\mathcal{X}_k) \in \mathcal{B}(\mathcal{X}_k, \omega)} \mathcal{L}_{CE}(f_{\theta}(\Phi(\mathcal{X}_{k,i}), \mathcal{Y}_{k,i})_{i=1}^{\nu}),$$

where \mathcal{L}_{CE} and f_{θ} represent the cross-entropy loss function and parameters of the local black-box model, respectively.

Table 1. Global test accuracy (AG%) \uparrow without data poisoning in uniform and non-IID FL settings, with and without FAVD data valuation. "No Val" refers to FL without data valuation.

Dataset \rightarrow	C-xray [11]	Cam17 [3]	HAM10K [49]	CIFAR10 [24]	CIFAR100 [24]
Shard \downarrow	FL setting \rightarrow	$n = 4,$ $k = 4$	$n = 5,$ $k = 5$	$n = 64,$ $k = 64$	$n = 100,$ $k = 70$
Uniform	No Val	91.37 \pm 1.54	91.82 \pm 1.21	73.61 \pm 1.59	85.59 \pm 0.76
	FAVD (ours)	93.75 \pm 1.20	94.62 \pm 1.15	75.48 \pm 0.42	88.42 \pm 0.21
non-IID	No Val	88.62 \pm 1.27	87.81 \pm 1.79	68.79 \pm 0.83	82.93 \pm 1.18
	FAVD (ours)	91.36 \pm 1.31	91.38 \pm 1.86	71.36 \pm 0.86	86.24 \pm 1.22

Result Discussion

- Higher accuracy in no-threat:** FAVD improves accuracy by 2-3% (uniform) and 3-4% (non-IID) by discarding misaligned data.
- Resilient to poisoning attacks:** Limits accuracy drop to 3-7% (uniform) and 8-10% (in highly non-IID settings).
- Superior data valuation:** Achieves highest MSDR (0.90) and BMR (0.86), surpassing other methods.
- Better client contribution consistency (CCC):** Maintains high CCC (~ 1), ensuring verifiable contributions even under threats.

Limitations and Future Work

- Benign data exploitation:** Enhance feature alignment, explore encryption & secure multi party computation protocols.
- Adaptive attack evasion:** Add behavioral analysis & temporal consistency checks.

Summary and Conclusion

FAVD enhances auditability, verifiability, and privacy in FL by leveraging local and global density functions for precise data valuation. Extensive evaluations show superior performance over state-of-the-art methods across diverse datasets.

References

K. Naveen Kumar, *et al.*, "The Impact of Adversarial Attacks on Federated Learning: A Survey," *IEEE TPAMI*, 2024.