When LoRA Betrays: Backdooring Text-to-Image Models by Masquerading as Benign Adapters

Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) has emerged as a leading technique for efficiently fine-tuning text-to-image diffusion models, and its widespread adoption on open-source platforms has fostered a vibrant culture of model sharing and customization. However, the same modular and plug-and-play flexibility that makes LoRA appealing also introduces a broader attack sur-face. To highlight this risk, we propose Masquerade-LoRA (MasqLoRA), the first backdoor attack that leverages the LoRA mechanism to stealthily inject malicious behavior into text-to-image diffusion models. MasqLoRA operates by freezing the base model parameters and updating only the low-rank adapter weights using a small number of “trigger word-target image” pairs. This enables the attacker to train a standalone backdoor LoRA module that embeds a hidden cross-modal mapping: when the module is loaded and a specific textual trigger is provided, the model produces a predefined visual output; other-wise, it behaves indistinguishably from the clean model, ensuring the stealthiness of the attack. Experimental results demonstrate that MasqLoRA can be trained with minimal resource overhead and achieves a high attack success rate of 99.8%. MasqLoRA reveals a severe and unique threat in the AI supply chain, underscoring the urgent need for dedicated defense mechanisms for the LoRA-centric sharing ecosystem.